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Moscow has been developing a new model of governance for Kaliningrad 
Oblast over the past year. It involves curbing the pathological mecha-
nisms which have held sway in the oblast so far (partly through the liqui-
dation of tariff concessions and improving the transparency of the amber 
trade) and improving the effectiveness of how public funds are disbursed 
(including dismissals in the Baltic Fleet, changes in the management of 
building the stadium for the 2018 FIFA World Cup). The changes in the re-
gional government and the fact that the governance of the oblast was en-
trusted to people sent from Moscow and had no links with the region was 
also an important stage of this process. The first one (July – October 2016) 
was Yevgeny Zinichev, a former bodyguard of President Putin. He was re-
placed by the current acting governor, Anton Alikhanov, a young econo-
mist from the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation. 
The changes are a result of many interwoven factors, above all Russia’s 
depleting financial resources and austerity policy, the increasing mili-
tarisation of the Russian Federation and the important role the oblast 
plays in this policy, and the need to ensure a satisfactory result in the 
upcoming presidential election (March 2018). Although there are at pre-
sent no visible symptoms suggesting an intensification of protest senti-
ments, Moscow is taking preventive action to try to tighten its grip on lo-
cal elites and residents, keeping in mind the public protests in the region 
in 2010 which the Kremlin found alarming. 
Kaliningrad Oblast remains an essential element of the Russian military 
strategy in the Baltic region. This is borne out by the deployment in the 
region of S-400 air defence systems, ships equipped with Kalibr missiles, 
and Bastion missile defence systems (which are nominally anti- ship 
weapons but are also adjusted to attacking ground targets). Furthermore, 
the deployment of Iskander missile systems has been launched which en-
ables the creation of a so-called ‘Anti-Access/Area Denial’ (A2/AD) zone, 
extending the range of Russian weapons to the territories and airspace of 
the neighbouring NATO member states. 
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I. KAlININgRAD’S SIgNIFICANCe FOR RuSSIA 
AND ITS SPeCIAl CHARACTeRISTICS
What makes Kaliningrad Oblast unique among the federal subjects of Russia is 
its geopolitical situation: it is a Russian semi-exclave surrounded by NATO and 
EU member states (Poland and Lithuania). The physical distance from Russia 
proper (over 360 km in a straight line) not only makes communication difficult 
but also contributes to the oblast’s intensifying relations with its neighbours. As 
a consequence, this loosens the bond between the oblast (its economy and citi-
zens) and the rest of Russia. For this reason Moscow has traditionally feared ex-
cessively strong influence from other countries in the region or even the future 
loss of this territory. On the other hand, the oblast is used by the Kremlin as an 
important instrument in its policy towards EU and NATO member states, which 
results, for example, in an intensified presence of  institutions of force in the 
oblast and restrictions in co-operation with the neighbouring countries. 
Kaliningrad Oblast is an essential element of the Russian military strat-
egy in the Baltic region. It is aimed at maintaining a military potential (see 
Appendix 4) that will successfully tie up the forces of a potential opponent, 
fulfilling tasks linked to monitoring alien military activity in the Baltic Sea 
and, depending on the conflict scenario, also: 
a. using the units deployed in Kaliningrad Oblast as supporting forces in the 
main attack in the Western strategic direction, or 
b. taking actions which have the character of military provocation while avo-
iding an open military conflict. 
The military units deployed in Kaliningrad Oblast have limited capabilities 
to conduct independent combat operations. Any long-term or high-inten-
sity actions are only possible as an element of actions taken by all forces in 
the Western strategic direction (Western Military District/Regional Group 
of Forces of Belarus and Russia). The main tasks of the forces grouped in Ka-
liningrad Oblast include: tying up the forces of the opponents in the frontier 
regions; conducting joint operations with forces deployed in Belarus as part 
of unblocking the oblast; and acts of sabotage at the rear of enemy troops (in-
cluding tactical sea landing). The main limitation for the operation of Russian 
forces in Kaliningrad Oblast – in addition to relying on support, above all lo-
gistical, from Russia proper – is the geography of the theatre of action which 
makes it difficult for armoured and mechanised troops to move (the poorly 
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developed network of roads, the hilly terrain and lakes). Due to the fact that it 
lies within the immediate range of NATO member states’ weapons of destruc-
tion, the maritime component of the troops in Kaliningrad Oblast (stationed in 
Baltiysk) has limited capabilities to act. 
Regardless of the strictly military features, the troops in Kaliningrad Oblast 
are a vital component of the psychological warfare which fits in with the 
policy of deterring NATO waged by Russia against the West (the fleet’s ac-
tivity, the commencement of the deployment of Bastion and Iskander missile 
systems in the oblast and spreading rumours about the presence of tactical nu-
clear weapons in the oblast).
The economic situation of Kaliningrad Oblast is strictly linked to that in the 
remaining part of Russia; most of the region’s production is sold within Russia, 
and the main investors are Russian business entities. The region’s economy is 
characterised by a small consumer market (around one million residents), 
low investment potential and an almost complete dependence on expen-
sive exports. The accessibility of supplies from Russia is limited by high tran-
sit costs, and imports from the EU are limited by customs duties and import 
bans (especially the embargo on agricultural and food products from Western 
countries imposed by Moscow in August 2014). The region’s investment at-
tractiveness is further reduced by the fact that foreigners have limited 
access to a large part of its area (1/3 of its territory) due to security meas-
ures. The economic privileges granted to the region in the early 1990s, which 
were expected to help overcome these barriers, in fact turned it into a grey 
zone for the trans-shipment of goods from third countries to Russia proper. 
Amber deposits (Kaliningrad Oblast has 90% of global resources; this sector is 
currently controlled by the state-owned corporation Rostec) are the main ad-
vantage of the region, but its budget benefits from this sector only to a limited 
degree (amber produced there is traded to a great extent in the grey economy, 
while its processing sector is poorly developed). Given the present level of eco-
nomic development, Kaliningrad Oblast is able to satisfy its demand for 
electricity by its own production, but the raw materials used in this process 
are imported. The construction of the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant in the oblast 
has been frozen since 2013 because the main investor, the state-controlled com-
pany Rosatom, has been unable to find potential foreign recipients of the elec-
tricity it will generate there. 
The Russian system of financial clearance between the federal budget and the 
regional budgets means that only 40% of public levies collected in Kaliningrad 
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Oblast go to the local budget, while the rest goes directly to the central budget 
of the federation from which federal transfers are then made (in 2015, they ac-
counted for over 30% of the region’s income).
The region’s unique geographic situation and the fact that many of its residents 
are immigrants (only around 50% of them were born in the oblast) contribute 
to a kind of separateness of the oblast’s society. Its special characteristics are 
influenced by the strong presence of military personnel (representatives of in-
stitutions of force and their families account for around 30% of the population), 
the high mobility and intensive contacts with neighbours from the EU (resi-
dents of the oblast go abroad more often than to Russia proper) and numerous 
proofs (including architectural) of the region’s rich German past. Residents of 
Kaliningrad Oblast are characterised by greater activity and entrepre-
neurship than residents of other parts of Russia (initially this was linked 
to trans-border shuttle trade). This was manifested in 2010 through massive 
political protests (up to 10,000 participants) which mainly concerned socio-
economic issues, but anti-Kremlin slogans were also heard. These forced Mos-
cow to replace the region’s governor. However, the Kremlin’s policy aimed at 
weakening the sense of distinctness of residents of Kaliningrad Oblast, dis-
crediting the opposition, breaking its unity and restricting the possibilities to 
act, has curbed the protest potential in the region. Less than 200 people took to 
the streets in Kaliningrad as part of the wave of anti-Putin protests that rolled 
across Russia in late 2011/early 2012, and voter turnout in the parliamentary 
election in 2016 was lower than the Russian average. Separatist tendencies in 
the oblast (which were not strong, anyway) have also been suppressed (cur-
rently around 4% of respondents accept the possibility of separating the oblast 
from Russia), and references to the German past of the region are continually 
becoming less visible. 
The general goal of the Kremlin’s policy towards the region is to keep its 
grip on it and to maintain social stability, but actions taken by Moscow 
towards the oblast have been inconsistent and often contradictory. In 
fact, given the strong presence of institutions of force and the weak position of 
the governors (most of whom lacked clear support from the Kremlin), power 
in the region has been divided, which would often lead to conflicts of inter-
est. The governors had no influence on decisions concerning institutions of 
force and the territory controlled by them as well as the key branches of the 
region’s economy. Both the amber sector and the project to construct a nuclear 
power plant have been supervised directly from the federal centre. In 2005, the 
Kremlin for the first time nominated an ‘outsider’, Georgy Boos, a businessman 
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from Moscow, for governor of Kaliningrad Oblast. Boos was tasked with 
strengthening the influence of the central government. However, by focus-
ing on promoting Moscow’s interests and ostentatiously disregarding the local 
elites and public, he brought about massive protests, which resulted in his dis-
missal. Boos was replaced by another weak governor, Nikolay Tsukanov, a lo-
cal resident who had no political support base in Moscow. Tsukanov managed 
to ensure social stability even though he also provided ostentatious examples 
of ineffective governance and – according to media reports – became involved 
in numerous corruption scandals. The new challenges the region needs to face 
are: Russia’s dwindling financial resources, the 2018 FIFA World Cup, and the 
intensifying militarisation of Russia. These have led to the Kremlin decid-
ing to take direct control of the oblast. The first step was to nominate 
Yevgeny Zinichev as acting governor – he was an FSB officer and a former 
trusted bodyguard of President Putin Next they replaced him with Anton 
Alikhanov, a young economist from the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
of the Russian Federation (for more information on Alikhanov see: The po-
litical situation).
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
10
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 1
2/
20
16
II. CuRReNT SITuATION IN THe RegION – 
MAJOR TReNDS
1. The economic situation
The region’s current economic situation is affected above all by the continu-
ing economic crisis in Russia and the changing conditions of doing business in 
the oblast. This is partly due to the discontinuation of tariff concessions on 
1 April 2016 which used to apply as part of the Special Economic Zone estab-
lished in 1996. The new approach to managing Kaliningrad’s economy is also 
having an impact. Anton Alikhanov began implementing this policy a year ago 
on behalf of the Kremlin, initially as deputy prime minister and acting prime 
minister of the oblast and currently as acting governor.
The drop in oil prices which coincided with Western economic sanctions and 
Russian counter-sanctions (goods shortages and increasing prices) have also 
had a strong adverse effect on the economy of Kaliningrad Oblast (although the 
region’s socio-economic indicators match average levels for Russia as a whole). 
Gross regional product (GRP) in 2015 fell by 7.6% (and is expected to fall a fur-
ther 1.3% in 2016; for more information on this, see Appendix 1). All potential 
growth factors remain negative at present. Investments in the region have 
decreased for the fourth year in a row (by 10% annually on average), and the 
residents’ real incomes have been falling since 2015 as well (by around 6%). The 
economic situation is still very tough, especially in the primary sector, the 
car industry (Kaliningrad’s Avtotor reduced its production by 50% in 2015), and 
trade and transport. However, some symptoms of an improvement of the situ-
ation have been observed in the processing industry (mainly the food sector), 
agriculture (which was to a great extent a result of the embargo on imports of 
food and agricultural products and the import substitution policy implement-
ed) and the constructions sector (partly in effect of the preparations for the 
2018 FIFA World Cup). 
Attempts to boost Kaliningrad’s economy have so far been unsuccessful. 
According to Alikhanov’s estimates, when the 1996 Special Economic Zone ap-
plied, the state budget ‘lost’ around 0.5 trillion roubles (up to US$15 billion) on 
customs duty exemptions and indirect taxes, and the oblast turned into a grey 
trans-shipment zone; only 109 residents have been registered in the 2006 Spe-
cial Economic Zone to date, principally all of them also benefited from tariff 
concessions, and their total investments are estimated to have reached around 
90 billion roubles (up to around US$2.5 billion). Over the past few years, the 
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Russian government has been trying to change the character of the 
oblast’s economy from one based on trans-shipment to one based on pro-
duction and exports, above all by liquidating the customs privileges granted 
in 1996. This is expected to help reduce the economic pathologies in the re-
gion. In spite of previous fears, the liquidation of the tariff concessions has not 
yet had any major adverse effect on the economy (no spectacular bankruptcies 
or protests have been seen). Around 800 entities in the region benefited from 
these concessions at the beginning of 2016. Being aware of the upcoming legal 
changes, they were preparing for them, for example, by increasing the imports 
of goods in the last months of the Special Economic Zone’s operation or by in-
creasing their reserves. Additionally, the Russian government, in an attempt 
to reduce the negative consequences of the liquidation of the tariff concessions, 
decided, for example, to lower the investment threshold (to 50 million roubles – 
currently around US$0.77 million) for residents of the currently existing Spe-
cial Economic Zone (established in 2006). This offers tax privileges, and they 
have planned to offer financial compensation to those businesses which have 
lost out as a result of the changes – in aggregate, an additional 67 billion rou-
bles (around US$1 billion) has been allocated from the federal budget for 2016 
for this purpose. This subsidy has caused an increase in the share of transfers 
from the federal budget in the oblast’s income structure from 30% in 2015 to 
a planned level of over 70% in 2016 The oblast’s total budget revenues were ex-
pected to increase in 2016 to a level of 108 billion roubles, including around 30 
billion roubles generated by the oblast itself, and the other 78 billion roubles as 
transfers from the federal centre (67 billion roubles to companies in connection 
with the liquidation of the tariff concessions and 10 billion roubles allocated for 
the region’s development, mainly for social welfare needs: healthcare, educa-
tion and social policy). However, since the special subsidies to companies were 
used to a lesser extent than expected (only a quarter of the planned 67 billion 
roubles had been spent by the end of September 2016), the federal government 
has decided to reduce them in 2016 to 24 billion roubles (around US$0.37 bil-
lion), which was taken into account in the 2016 budget amendment (accepted 
in November 2016).
At the same time, the federal government has commenced work on a new doc-
ument that will set the rules for the operation of the economy of Kaliningrad 
Oblast. They are expected to boost the region’s development (the bill is already 
in the final phase of negotiations). According to declarations, the new docu-
ment will offer tax relief to investors and is expected to make the region more 
open to foreign investors, for example, by introducing visa facilitations for 
foreigners – electronic visas received on the oblast’s border. The Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, referring to the promised visa facili-
tations, decided to discontinue – starting from 1 January 2017 – the experiment 
of issuing short-term tourist visas to Kaliningrad Oblast (these facilitations 
were introduced in 2002; around 1,000 foreign tourists used them annually). 
The region does not stand out among other Russian federal subjects as 
regards the level of corruption (the oblast has relatively small funds at its 
disposal) and corruption schemes. So-called ‘everyday corruption’ in citizen-
public servant relations has been disappearing in the oblast over the past few 
years (because it is relatively easy to reveal it and the gains are low). At pre-
sent, public servants ever more often derive financial benefits and siphon off 
public money by discriminating in favour of firms and projects owned by their 
relatives and friends. 
This is visible in Kaliningrad on all levels of public administration, including 
on the level of the mayor of Kaliningrad, Alexander Yaroshuk, or the former 
governor of the oblast, Tsukanov, who have been accused - in the media and 
Transparency International’s reports - of favouring in public tenders firms 
they have links to and federal corporations present in the oblast (in one case 
related to Tsukanov, the prosecutor’s office admitted conflict of interest). One 
of the worst corruption scandals concerns the construction of the football sta-
dium. Local officials are accused of having chosen the worst location for the 
stadium on a swampy island in the city centre guided by the interests of the 
firms linked to them. The capital-intensive investment (it is practically impos-
sible to calculate how many tonnes of sand and other construction materials 
were needed for the ground preparation) will allow the expansion of housing 
development areas in the city centre. 
The ambers sector is also a perfect area for siphoning off public funds 
from the region as its greater part has in fact been functioning in the grey 
economy for 25 years. In 2015, the Kaliningrad Amber Factory (a mine) located 
in Yantarny extracted 313 tonnes of amber, and its income from sale reached 
1.3 billion roubles (around US$21 million). The estimated level of illegal pro-
duction in Kaliningrad is currently around 150 tonnes annually, and in most 
cases this is higher quality amber, larger nuggets. Until 2012, when the amber 
factory was owned by the Russian Ministry of Finance, illegal amber produc-
tion was flourishing, and the amber trade was controlled by organised crimi-
nal groups (Viktor Bogdan, who currently lives in Poland, was allegedly one of 
their main leaders). Since 2012, when the state-controlled holding Rostec be-
came the owner of the factory, control over amber cash flows has been in the 
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hands of President Putin’s old friend, Viktor Chemezov (the head of Rostec) and 
his circle. However, the low transparency in the sector and budget revenues 
generated by it have not changed in principle. 
The oblast’s new government has been trying to curb abuse and improve 
the efficiency of how public money is used. Over the past few months, the 
oblast’s government has made efforts to improve the transparency of the am-
ber trade, insisting that the state-owned company Rostec should standardise 
production and sell amber on the exchange (although the first auctions were 
held in July 2016, amber worth a total of only 50 million roubles, i.e. around 
15% of quarterly output, was sold during the first three months), at the same 
time supporting the development of the processing industry in the region. The 
first special auction is to be held in late December; local jewellers have previ-
ously had very limited access to amber. It is still uncertain whether the re-
gional government intends to combat illegal amber extraction and how it will 
do this. Another major element of the region’s economic policy is the increased 
scrutiny of the football stadium construction project aimed at guaranteeing it 
finishes on time and preventing any further growth in its costs. 
2. The social situation
The continuing economic crisis in Russia has adversely affected the social situ-
ation in Kaliningrad oblast (real wages fell by around 10% in 2015 alone). The 
crisis has also brought about a deterioration of public sentiment manifested 
above all through dissatisfaction with the local socio-economic situation and 
freefalling evaluations of people’s own financial situation. This is reflected in 
the results of social surveys (for example, the percentage of those dissatisfied 
with the situation in the region increased by 12 percentage points between No-
vember 2014 and April 2015; for more information, see Appendix 2). Residents 
of the oblast also declare that they have noticed increased dissatisfaction with 
the government’s actions among the general public due to the increasing prices 
during the crisis (a survey conducted in March 2016). However, the deteriora-
tion of people’s living standards has not led to outbreaks of public dissatisfac-
tion, and the predominant stance taken by residents is passive adaptation to 
the deteriorating financial conditions. The surveys also show that, despite the 
predominant belief that massive acts of protest are unlikely, residents of Ka-
liningrad declare their readiness to take part in possible demonstrations more 
than twice as often as people on average in Russia. Only small protests, with 
participation in the tens or at most hundreds have been seen in Kaliningrad 
over the past few months where strictly political slogans were not raised. For 
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example, the popular protests of people who have been wronged by developers 
and protests against construction projects on the seaside (including the hotel 
in Svetlogorsk) have taken place. 
For Kaliningrad Oblast, keeping a relatively open border with its neigh-
bours is an important factor ameliorating social tension. This is a kind 
of a safety valve which enables, for example, for the shortages in the region’s 
supplies to be made up by shopping and medical tourism, mainly to Poland, 
and a certain limited development of entrepreneurship based on cross-border 
co-operation (mainly shuttle trade). 
The Russian government’s anti-Western propaganda campaign (aimed at 
constructing an image of Russia as a besieged fortress and an image of Western 
countries as enemies) appeals less to residents of Kaliningrad than to those 
of other regions of the Russian Federation. Social surveys reveal that residents 
of the oblast declare a positive attitude towards Poles and Lithuanians. On the 
other hand, Moscow’s fears that overly close relations between residents of Ka-
liningrad Oblast and their neighbours may result in anti-Kremlin sentiments 
have proven unfounded. The Kremlin’s activity continues to be evaluated 
very positively in Kaliningrad Oblast (poll results are similar to the Russian 
average; according to a survey conducted in March 2016, the president’s activ-
ity was evaluated positively by 86% of residents of the oblast, and the prime 
minister’s activity by 56% of them). The annexation of Crimea met with mas-
sive approval (88%). The opinions are even better in those cities where the Bal-
tic Fleet is stationed. 
Similarly, the Polish government’s decision to suspend small border traf-
fic (in July 2016) between Poland and Russia, even though it is viewed as 
an inconvenience by residents of the oblast, has not provoked any marked 
emotion because they have relatively easy access to EU member states’ visas, 
and this allows them to maintain intensive external contacts (in the case of 
Russians less than 50% of border crossings with Poland were made on the 
grounds of the small border traffic cards). What poses a more serious problem 
to the oblast are the less frequent visits of Polish citizens to the region and their 
less intensive shopping (part of the excise duty on alcohol and fuel goes to the 
oblast’s budget). The local grey economy, where illegal productions of alcohol 
products had been flourishing in the past few years, has also been adversely 
affected. It cannot be ruled out that, if the suspension of small border traffic 
is maintained, the attitude of the oblast’s residents to Poland may deteriorate. 
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3. The political situation
The irregularities in managing funds in the oblast (the examples being the 
Baltic Fleet, the stadium construction and the airport development) recently 
revealed by prosecution authorities are an element of the central govern-
ment’s broader policy aimed at disciplining the local elites. This is also 
linked to the political calendar (the parliamentary election in September 2016 
and, above all, the presidential election planned for March 2018). 
The recent replacements of the oblast’s governors have been a manifesta-
tion of this policy. Yevgeny Zinichev, who previously served as the head of the 
oblast directorate of the Federal Security Service (FSB), was nominated as act-
ing governor on 28 July 2016 (he had been an officer of the Federal Protective 
Service and one of President Putin’s bodyguards; he had led the FSB in Kalin-
ingrad Oblast from 2015). However, he was replaced on 6 October by the then 
acting prime minister of the oblast, Anton Alikhanov, and was appointed one 
of the six deputy heads of the FSB. The new acting governor has a good opinion 
in business circles and has the Kremlin’s approval for cracking down on the 
most scandalous elements of the corrupt system and for concentrating the cash 
flow in the present government’s hands. Leonid Mikhailyuk, the new head of 
the local FSB who had no previous links with the oblast (until September 2016 
he served as a deputy head of the FSB in Perm) is expected to help him with 
this task. 
Staff reshuffles have brought in a modification of the oblast’s political govern-
ance model, i.e. depriving representatives of the local elites of influence in the 
decision-making process and replacing them with people sent from Moscow. 
This will result in Moscow tightening its grip on the region and reducing the 
scale of the existing pathologies linked to fund management in the oblast or 
state-controlled companies profiting from criminal activity (for more infor-
mation on this issue see section II.1.).
Anton Alikhanov, acting governor of Kaliningrad Oblast. He was born in 
1986 in Sukhumi. He has a PhD in economy and a degree in law. He is the 
youngest head of a Russian federal subject in Russia’s modern history. 
He worked for the Russian Ministry of Justice from 2010 and for the Minis-
try of Industry and Trade from 2013, for example, as director of the Depart-
ment for Regulating Foreign Co-operation. 
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On 22 September 2015, Alikhanov was nominated deputy prime minister 
of Kaliningrad Oblast (he was in charge of agriculture and industry). Less 
than a year later (on 30 July 2016) he was promoted to acting prime minister 
of the oblast. This position was reinstated by the then newly nominated 
acting governor Yevgeny Zinichev (under Tsukanov’s rule, the regional 
government was led by the governor). 
On 6 October 2016, President Vladimir Putin entrusted Alikhanov with the 
function of acting governor of Kaliningrad Oblast (the election for this po-
sition will be held in September 2017). When submitting the nomination, 
the president made mention of the fact that Alikhanov was one of the au-
thors of the new bill concerning the development of Kaliningrad Oblast. 
According to press reports, Alikhanov may count on strong support from 
Moscow. He comes from a wealthy family. His father, Andrey Alikhanov, 
was among the founders of the food processing giant, Rosmiasomoltorg 
(holding a 20% stake). Andrey is a good friend of the present deputy prime 
minister of Russia, Igor Shuvalov, and the presidential envoy of the Volga 
Federal District, Mikhail Babich. 
The media also hints that Alikhanov might be connected to the head of Ros-
tec, Viktor Chemezov (Rostec is the owner of Kaliningrad Amber Factory). 
The parliamentary and local elections on 18 September 2016 were the first 
effectiveness test for the new government. Although the government party 
achieved a result worse than the average in Russia, it may be acknowledged 
that it passed the test. United Russia officially garnered 43.4% of the vote (54.2% 
in the Russian Federation as a whole) and its candidates won in both single-
member constituencies in the oblast. The same three parties as elsewhere in 
Russia: the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), the Communists (CPRF) 
and A Just Russia (JR) exceeded the 5% threshold. The support levels for the op-
position parties were marginal (for more information see Appendix 3). 
Along with the election to the State Duma, elections to the oblast parliament 
and Kaliningrad city hall were held. United Russia won these elections, too (29 
out of 40 seats in the regional parliament and 20 of 28 seats in the city coun-
cil) mainly owing to victories in single-member constituencies (winning 33 
of a possible 34 seats there). Approved opposition parties and two deputies of 
Patriots of Russia, which is in fact a pro-Kremlin party, also made it to the re-
gional parliament. 
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Numerous cases of manipulation and electoral fraud were seen during the 
elections (as in other parts of Russia). The election campaign in the oblast was 
almost unnoticeable, which was proof of the attempt to discourage citizens 
from political activity. In effect of this, voter turnout was low – officially 44% 
(compared to 47.9% on the nationwide scale) and was most likely significantly 
overstated by the government. Other means of manipulation included gerry-
mandering (changing the boundaries of the constituencies in a manner dis-
advantageous to the opposition), paying for votes for United Russia, writing 
additional votes in the final stage of the voting and most likely forging reports 
compiled in polling stations.
4. The military and security situation
The Russian government’s stoking the atmosphere of threat allegedly posed by 
NATO member states to the oblast is used as an excuse for the organisational 
changes in the Baltic Fleet launched in spring 2016. On 1st April the decision 
was taken to re-form the 11th Army Corps on the base of existing ground units, 
and supplies of new weapons were promised. The Russian side has so far lim-
ited itself to creating the command structures and the staff for the new corps, 
but no new combat units have been developed. The most recent essential re-
inforcement of combat potential took place in 2011 when an additional artil-
lery brigade was formed (on the foundation of subdivisions which until then 
reported to other structures). It may be estimated that the forces currently sta-
tioned in Kaliningrad Oblast have around 25,000 soldiers in aggregate. 
S-400 air defence systems (in 2012-2013) have been deployed in Kaliningrad 
Oblast (they have a range of 400 km; two divisions of the 183rd Anti-Aircraft 
Rocket Regiment have been equipped with this system) as have Bastion mis-
sile systems (with Onyx missiles which have a range of at least 450 km in the 
case of attacking ground targets; one of the divisions of the 25th Coastal Missile 
Regiment was equipped with Bastion systems in November 2016). This, along-
side the commencement (in October 2016) of the deployment of Iskander-M 
missile systems (with a range of at least 500 km) has had a major impact on 
the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the 
Baltic Sea basin. The date of completion of the process of rearmament of the 
152nd Missile Brigade with Iskander missies is still an open question – initially 
it was planned for completion in 2018. The Bastion systems attract special at-
tention – it should be assumed that, as with the solutions applied on the lat-
est Russian warships, these systems can be used to launch Kalibr missiles 
(with a range of at least 1,500 km). Furthermore, the Baltic Fleet has four large 
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project 20380 corvettes (introduced into service in 2008-2014 which have 
a base in Baltiysk) which can be equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles, as well 
as two newer and smaller project 21631 corvettes which are already equipped 
with Kalibr missiles (they changed their base from Sevastopol to Baltiysk in 
October 2016). It should be emphasised that Poland is also within the range of 
the vessels (including submarines) equipped with these missiles operating in 
the Black Sea basin. The deployment of these systems has significantly ex-
panded the spectrum of the Russian troops’ attack capabilities and has 
enabled the creation of a so-called Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) zone 
based on Kaliningrad Oblast. If the zone is created, the territories and air-
spaces of the neighbouring NATO member states and, considering the range of 
Kalibr missiles, also the entire Central Europe and Scandinavia will be within 
the range of Russian weapons. 
Unlike the situation in the mid-1990s, Kaliningrad Oblast has lost its fea-
tures of an ‘aircraft carrier’ (mainly as a result of the development of 
air- and sea-based precision weapons). However, the deployment of the 
new types of missile systems has made this region highly essential in the 
context of the potential paralysing of military activity on NATO’s east-
ern flank. Units of the land component of troops are the last to be rearmed on 
the scale of the Western Military District as a whole. Only the tempo of rear-
mament of the air and maritime components is similar to that seen in other 
troop units in the European part of the Russian Federation. From the Russian 
viewpoint, the only element of strategic significance is the new (it was put into 
operation in 2011) early warning radar station Voronezh-DM located in Pion-
ersky, and first S-400 air defence systems outside Moscow were deployed in 
Kaliningrad to protect it. However, taking into account the viewpoint of the 
countries in the region, it is the Anti-Access/Area Denial zone created on 
the basis of the new missile systems that has strategic significance. 
One consequence of the increasing militarisation of the oblast is the intensi-
fied activity of the secret services and other institutions of force. A spe-
cial role is played by the structures of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and 
the Federal Protective Service (FSO) which are in charge of the oblast’s coun-
ter-intelligence protection and governmental special communication. Over 
the past few years the oblast has been playing an increasingly important role 
as a staging base for carrying out intelligence tasks in lithuania and Po-
land. One proof that intelligence activity has intensified is found in the fact 
that tasks which have the nature of classical political intelligence are carried 
out by the FSB which, according to the competences act, is only tasked with 
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shallow trans-border intelligence. The fact that proves that such actions are 
taking place is the indictment brought against the FSB officer Nikolai Filip-
chenko who was detained in Lithuania on charges of attempting to recruit of-
ficers of the Lithuanian services tasked with protecting the premises used by 
the president of Lithuania. 
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III. POSSIBle DevelOPMeNTS
•	 The key task for the Kremlin in the immediate future as regards Kalin-
ingrad Oblast is for the upcoming presidential election to be held there 
without major incident. The special characteristics of Kaliningrad Oblast 
mean that the Kremlin will be making efforts to maintain social stability, 
for example, through economic development, maintaining the residents’ 
ability to travel outside the oblast and continuing subsidising the region 
(although, most likely, the value of the subsidies will be reduced when com-
pared to 2016, which has been an exceptional year in this context). At the 
same time, the militarisation of the region and the upward trend of secret 
services control there will be intensifying. The Kremlin will still have the 
dilemma as to how these two processes can be reconciled. 
•	 The oblast’s new government will most likely be able to reduce the scale of 
economic pathologies in the region, which is in the interest of the Kremlin 
and the state budget. However, there is room for scepticism as to whether 
the mechanisms that enable the government elite (this circle is constantly 
contracting) to grow rich will be eliminated. This is because the general 
character of the Russian state is not changing: the centralised decision-
making process, the lack of competition, the strongly developed bureau-
cratic apparatus, and the predominance of the dominant position of insti-
tutions of force. 
•	 Kaliningrad also remains an important instrument of Moscow’s policy to-
wards the EU and NATO. The experience observed so far and the fact that 
the secret services are tightening their grip on society mean that the Rus-
sian government can allow the region to continue developing co-operation 
with its neighbours (including the northern part of Poland), without risking 
that anti-Kremlin sentiments will be stoked. Poland’s decision to suspend 
small border traffic may be used by the Russian government to discredit 
Poland in the eyes of residents of Kaliningrad Oblast and, should relations 
between Russia and Brussels improve, also in the eyes of EU member states 
by using this example as proof of “Polish Russophobia”. 
•	 It should not be expected that the difficult economic situation in the re-
gion will lead to serious outbreaks of public dissatisfaction that would pose 
a threat to the regime. If any protests occur, these will most likely be only 
isolated cases. Despite their special characteristics, residents of the oblast 
are generally receptive to the Kremlin propaganda which claims that NATO 
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member states pose a threat to Russia. Since the oblast is located on the po-
tential frontline, this strengthens the desire to focus on the leader and seek 
support from the federal centre. 
•	 The expected complete rearmament of the 152nd Missile Brigade in Chern-
yakhovsk (by 2018) with Iskander missiles will not principally change the 
military situation around Kaliningrad Oblast. At the most this will slightly 
expand the spectrum of Russian impact as part of the anti-NATO access 
denial zone. Russia may use this as a bargaining chip in an attempt to con-
vince the new US administration (and the governments of some Europe-
an NATO member states) to withdraw from building elements of the US-
NATO missile defence system in Redzikowo, Poland. If such attempts are 
unsuccessful, the deployment of Iskanders, which has long been planned, 
will most likely be presented as a response to the implementation of this 
project. 
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APPeNDICeS
Appendix 1. Key socio-economic indicators of Kaliningrad Oblast
2015 First six months of 2016 (against first six months of 2015)
Gross regional product (change %) -7.6
-1.3 
(all-year forecast)
Industrial production  (change %) -7.0 1.1
Agricultural production (change %) 10.2 n/a
Retail trade (change %) -8.7 -1.5
Inflation (figures for December) 11.7 3.5
Investments in share capital (change %) -13.1 -8.9
Citizens’ real incomes -5.8 3.7
Real wages -9.9 -2.1
Unemployment (in %) 5.9 5.9
Regional budget deficit (in %) 19 n/a
Source: Rosstat
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Appendix 2. Public sentiment in Kaliningrad Oblast according to public 
opinion polls 
1. How do you evaluate the government’s work? (survey conducted by KM 
Group in March 2016)
president
of the Russian Federation 
prime minister
of the Russian Federation
Good Bad I cannot say
anything about
their work
Good Bad I cannot say
anything about
their work
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
86%
56%
17%
6%6%  2%
2. Have you noticed increasing dissatisfaction in your environment with the 
activities of the government and the leaders of our oblast in connection with 
the growing prices of goods, utility services, etc.? (survey conducted by KM 
Group in March 2016)
I have noticed – 86%
I have not noticed – 14%
3. If residents of the oblast took to the streets the next Sunday, would you per-
sonally take part in the demonstration? (survey conducted by KM Group in 
March 2016) 
Certainly yes Rather yes Rather not Certainly not
0
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50
10%
16% 16%
50%
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4. Which status of Kaliningrad Oblast would be the most beneficial from the 
viewpoint of the interests of its residents? (survey conducted by KM Group)
2003* 2014
[%]
0
20
40
60
80
100
The status should remain unchanged
in the future: an oblast within
the Russian Federation – 35%
The oblast should remain within
the Russian Federation but it should
be granted special status – 53%
A region under joint jurisdiction
of the Russian Federation
and the EU – 2%
The oblast should remain part
of the Russian Federation but practically
be under the control of the EU  – 1%
Refused to answer – 8%
An independent state outside
the Russian Federation – 1%
* the figures are rounded to the nearest
  percentage point'
The present status
is optimal – 22%
An oblast within
the Russian Federation
with separate
political status – 11%
An oblast within
the Russian Federation
with a special
economic status – 37%
A region under joint jurisdiction
of the Russian Federation
and the EU  – 12%
An independent state outside
the Russian Federation – 7%
Refused to answer – 12%
5. Do you agree with the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol to our country 
as subjects of the Russian Federation? (survey conducted by KM Group in 
April 2014) 
I agree – 88%
I do not agree – 4%
Refused to answer – 8%
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6. Evaluation of the situation in the region
KALININGRAD OBLAST: What is your level of satisfaction
with the way things are going in Kaliningrad Oblast? 
(A survey conducted by KM Group in March 2015)
RUSSIAN FEDERATION: What is your level of satisfaction
with the way things are going in the region?
(A nationwide survey conducted by FOM in March 2015)
Satisfied – 46%
(aggregated definitely
and rather responses)
Satisfied – 43%
(aggregated definitely
and rather responses)
Dissatisfied – 31%
(aggregated definitely
and rather responses)
Dissatisfied – 49%
(aggregated definitely
and rather responses)
Refused to answer – 23%
Refused to answer – 8%
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Appendix 3. Official results of the parliamentary and local elections in Kali-
ningrad Oblast held on 18 September 2016 
Political party election to the State Duma
election to the regional 
parliament  
in Kaliningrad Oblast
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Percentage 
of those who 
voted for 
party list  
(5% threshold)
Seats won 
in the two 
single-mem-
ber constitu-
encies
Percentage 
of those who 
voted for 
party list  
(5% thresh-
old)
Number of 
seats (includ-
ing those won 
in the 20 sin-
gle-member 
constituen-
cies)
united Russia 43.4% 2 41.2% 29 (19) 54.2%
liberal-
Democratic 
Party 
of Russia
16.6% 0 16.7% 4 (0) 13.1%
Communist 
Party of 
the Russian 
Federation
14.0% 0 16.7% 4 (0) 13.3%
A Just Russia 5.6% 0 7.1% 1 (0) 6.2%
Patriots 
of Russia 3.4% 0 5.6% 2 (1) 0.6%
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Appendix 4. Russian military units in Kaliningrad Oblast
(general military and combat support sub-units and their basic weapons in compli-
ance with CFE are specified along with the make-up of the units)
Central subordination units 
 − 1407th Central Artillery Armament Base – Kaliningrad.
land Forces (units reporting directly to the command  
of the Western Military District)
 − 82nd Radio-Technical Brigade – Primorye (part of the unit, the other part is 
located in Smolensk Oblast);
 − 841st Radio-Electronic Combat Centre – Yantarny.
Aerospace Forces
 − NN. Radio-Technical Node (Voronezh-DM radar station) – Pionersky;
 − 26th Measurement Point (Sazhen-TM quantum-optical station, Fazan com-
mand and measurement system).
Naval Forces (Baltic Fleet) 
Maritime component:
 − 128th Surface Ship Brigade – Baltiysk (one project 11540 frigate, four project 
20380 corvettes equipped with Kalibr missiles; two project 965A destroyer 
ships were withdrawn from service in 2016);
 − 71st Landing Ship Brigade – Baltiysk (four project 775/775M landing ships, 
two project 12322 Zubr air-cushioned landing crafts, two project 21820 
landing boats, three project 11770 boats and one project 1176 landing boat);
 − 64th Maritime Region Protection Brigade – Baltiysk (146th Anti-Submarine 
Warfare Tactical Group);
 −  six project 1331M ZOP corvettes; 323rd Trawler Division – four project 12650 
base minesweepers, six project 13000 and 10750 roadstead minesweepers; 
313th Spetsnaz Division);
 − 36th Missile Boat Brigade – Baltiysk (1st Missile Boat Squadron – seven pro-
ject 12411/12411M missile corvettes; 106th Small Missile Ship Squadron – four 
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project 12341 missile corvettes; two project 21631 missile corvettes with Ka-
libr missiles);
 − 342nd Emergency and Rescue Division – Baltiysk (twelve rescue and fire 
protection units);
 − 72nd Reconnaissance Ship Squadron – Baltiysk (two medium-sized project 
864 reconnaissance ships, two small project 503M reconnaissance ships);
 − 603rd Hydrographic Ship Squadron – Baltiysk (one project 861 hydrographic 
ship, seven hydrographic boats);
 − 51st Hydrographic Service Region – Baltiysk (six hydrographic boats);
 − Group of Supply Units – Baltiysk (eleven auxiliary units, including two 
tankers and eight tugs).
Land component:
 − 336th Marine Infantry Brigade – Baltiysk (two marine infantry battalions, 
one landing and assault battalion, two artillery squadrons; 134 BTR-80/82A 
armoured personnel carriers, eighteen 122 mm 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled 
howitzers, twelve 120 mm 2S9 Nona-S self-propelled howitzers, six 122 mm 
BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers);
 − 561st Maritime Reconnaissance Point – Parusnoye (two Spetsnaz compa-
nies);
 − 25th Coastal Missile Regiment – Donskoye (two missile batteries, six Redut 
system launchers);
 − NN. Arsenal – Baltiysk.
Air component:
 − a squadron of ZOP helicopters from the 72nd Airbase – Donskoye (fourteen 
ZOP Ka-27PL/PS helicopters).
The group of land Forces reporting to the Baltic Fleet command
11th Army Corps – Kaliningrad – consisting of:
 − 7th Mechanised Regiment – Kaliningrad (three mechanised battalions, 
one tank battalion, a squadron of self-propelled artillery; 85 BMP-2 infan-
try fighting vehicles, 30 T-72B tanks, eighteen 152 mm 2S3 Akatsiya self-
propelled howitzers, twelve 120 mm 2B16 Nona-K towed howitzers; gen-
eral military battalions with a three-company structure; the possibility 
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to develop a mechanised squadron on the basis of the equipment stored in 
weapon and ammunition bases);
 − 79th Mechanised Brigade – Gusev (three mechanised battalions, a tank bat-
talion, two self-propelled artillery squadrons, one missile artillery squad-
ron, one anti-tank artillery squadron; 41 T-72B tanks, 159 MT-LB armoured 
personnel carriers, eleven BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers, 36 152 mm 
2S3 Akatsiya self-propelled howitzers, eighteen 120 mm 2S12 Sani mortars, 
twelve 122 mm BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, twelve 100 mm MT-12 
Rapira anti-tank cannons; general military battalions with four-company 
structure);
 − 244th Artillery Brigade – Kaliningrad (one self-propelled artillery squad-
ron, one missile artillery squadron; eighteen 152 mm 2A36 Giatsint-B towed 
howitzers, eighteen 122 mm BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers);
 − 152nd Missile Brigade – Chernyakhovsk (three missile squadrons, twelve 
9K79 Tochka-U missile systems; there are plans to replace them with Is-
kander systems by 2018);
 − 22nd Anti-Aircraft Rocket Regiment – Kaliningrad (four missile batteries, 
sixteen 9K330 Tor systems).
units directly reporting to the Baltic Fleet command:
 − 69th Engineer Regiment – Gvardeysk;
 − 254th Spetsnaz Radio-Technical Battalion – Gvardeysk;
 − 134th Communication Battalion – Kaliningrad;
 − 135th Communication Battalion – Kaliningrad;
 − 2574th Weapons and Ammunition Base – Guryevsk/Ryabinovka (it is pos-
sible to develop a tank regiment);
 − 2676th Weapons and Ammunition Base – Cherepanovo (it is possible to de-
velop a mechanised regiment);
 − 2652nd Artillery Weapons and Ammunition Base – Prokhladnoye (it is pos-
sible to develop an artillery regiment);
 − 148th Repair and Construction Battalion – Kaliningrad.
The group of Aerospace Forces reporting to the Baltic Fleet 
command 
44th Anti-Aircraft Division – Kaliningrad – consisting of:
 − 183rd Anti-Aircraft Rocket Regiment – Gvardeysk (six missile squadrons; 
sixteen S-400 systems, 24 S-300PS systems, six 96K6 Pantsir-S1 systems);
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 − 1545th Anti-Aircraft Rocket Regiment – Znamensk (two missile squadrons; 
sixteen S-300W systems);
 − 81st Radio-Technical Regiment – Pereyaslavskoye.
units directly reporting to the Baltic Fleet command:
 − 72nd Airbase – Chkalovsk (one fighter aircraft squadron, two multirole 
squadrons; eleven Su-27/Su-27P fighter aircraft, thirteen Su-27SM3 mul-
tirole combat aircraft, eight Su-30M2 multirole combat aircraft, twelve 
Mi-24 combat helicopters, eight Mi-8 combat support helicopters);
 − assault squadron of the 72nd Airbase – Chernyakhovsk (sixteen Su-24M/
Su-24MR front-line bombers, planned for rearmament by 2017 with new 
Su-30/ Su-34 multirole combat aircraft);
 − transport squadron of the 72nd Airbase – Khrabrovo (three An-26 transport 
aircraft, two An-140-100 transport aircraft);
 − 81st Communication and Radio-Technical Battalion – Primorsk/Lunino;
 − 82nd Communication and Radio-Technical Battalion – Kaliningrad.
